Unexpected Reminders

I saw this production on my last trip to England (far too long ago, now). What a pleasure it was to see Judi Dench, Patricia Hodge and the rest of the remarkable cast. A little taste, stumbled on by surprise, courtesy of the tubes:

Limbaugh's Lachrymose Limping

So, Rush Limbaugh's defenders have been claiming that a double standard is at play in the reaction to his vicious tirades against Sandra Fluke, because the firestorm he is facing is much worse than that faced by Ed Schultz when he called Laura Ingraham a "right-wing slut."

Schultz's misogynistic slur of Ingraham was indefensible. MSNBC would have been in the right had it chosen to fire him, However, to conflate Schultz's slur with Limbaugh's presumes an equivalence in the offense and in the displayed contrition which is simply not the case. First, the offenses. Here is Ed Schultz:



Again, this is indefensible. However, it happened once. Limbaugh, by contrast, repeated variations of his attack on law student Sandra Fluke over a three day period, scoring a whopping fifty-three iterations. Here, watch all 53 of them for yourself:



So, bad as Schultz's offense was--and it was plenty bad--Limbaugh's is of another order of magnitude.

As to contrition, the same would apply. Here's Ed Schultz's apology:

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Say what you like, that's a pretty full-throated, unequivocal apology, one which acknowledges the depth of the offense, and in no way tries to minimize it. It was Ingraham's right to choose whether to accept or reject it, and MSNBC's right to determine whether it was sufficient.

Here's Rush Limbaugh's first apology:

For over 20 years, I have illustrated the absurd with absurdity, three hours a day, five days a week. In this instance, I chose the wrong words in my analogy of the situation. I did not mean a personal attack on Ms. Fluke.
I think it is absolutely absurd that during these very serious political times, we are discussing personal sexual recreational activities before members of Congress. I personally do not agree that American citizens should pay for these social activities. What happened to personal responsibility and accountability? Where do we draw the line? If this is accepted as the norm, what will follow? Will we be debating if taxpayers should pay for new sneakers for all students that are interested in running to keep fit?In my monologue, I posited that it is not our business whatsoever to know what is going on in anyone's bedroom nor do I think it is a topic that should reach a Presidential level.

My choice of words was not the best, and in the attempt to be humorous, I created a national stir. I sincerely apologize to Ms. Fluke for the insulting word choices.

Well, not exactly true, is it? It wasn't, as demonstrated by the above video, merely "not the best choice of words," nor was it a single analogy. Moreover, Limbaugh's contention that Ms. Fluke wanted the taxpayer to pay for her contraception is wildly inaccurate. As Ms. Fluke's testimony makes clear, she was opposing the creation of an exemption of employers and universities from the regulations under the Affordable Care Act which would include contraception within the mandatory scope of coverage. Here, see for yourself:



Now, Ms. Fluke, as a Georgetown University Law School student is "eligible and required to enroll in the most comprehensive student injury and sickness plan offered through the University, unless [her] other insurance coverage meets specific University requirements." As the site makes clear, "A charge for this Premier Plan is placed on eligible students' accounts, per their registration status referenced above, once per Academic Year," unless they have appropriate coverage and elect to waive it. So, who is paying for Ms. Fluke's medical coverage? Ms. Fluke. She was opposing both the Blunt-Rubio bill to allow any and all employers to limit insurance coverage based on moral reservations, and specifically the efforts of the USCCB to secure an exemption for Catholic universities and similar entities to contour Ms. Fluke's and her fellow students' legally prescribed coverage to its religious beliefs. You may think she is wrong as a matter of public policy (I do not; As I have previously pointed out, the Supreme Court held as long ago as 1879 that "[t]o permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances). However, even if you disagree with her, Ms. Fluke is due the elementary justice of acknowledging that she is arguing that her insurance payments to Georgetown should buy as much coverage as if she were not attending a Catholic University, consistent with Supreme Court case law from 1879 through the present.

As to Limbaugh's on-air apology, he apologized for the use of the "two words" slut and prostitute "to describe her [Ms. Fluke]. I do not think she is either of these two words":



Now, I agree that this is somewhat better--although he later, in typical fashion, claimed that his offense was that he acted like Democrats, saying "[a]gainst my own instincts, against my own knowledge, against everything I know to be right and wrong, I descended to their level when I used those two words to describe Sandra Fluke. That was my error. I became like them." Limbaugh's offense was not, of course, limited to two words; 53 slurs over three days is not a "heat of battle" mistake. Nor does his blaming the Democrats make any sense--Schultz's offense was egregious, I agree, but hardly comparable, and, in any event, Limbaugh should own his own mistakes, period.

Limbaugh has, as of this writing, lost 13 sponsors and 1 radio station. It's hard to muster any sympathy for him.

The GOP "Charm Offensive" on Women

The GOP does seem to be taking an interesting tack in trying to gain womb's votes, don't they?

And conservatives are uneasily distancing themselves from Limbaugh's nasty slander of a Georgetown law student as a "slut" and a "prostitute" because she testified about other medical grounds for the prescription of contraception, but not very strenuously, because it is, after all, Limbaugh. Notably, Mitt Romney's schoolmarmish response ("not language I would have used"), earned a scornful response from David Axelrod: "Wow. Profiles in Courage," with an unanswered (to date) follow up: What about the spirit of what Rush said? Was that OK?"

But they must have a secret plan, you say. Of course, here it is being tested:



Seriously, the GOP base seems to have an unending appetite for cruelty, as Ta-Nehisi Coates argues at the link. Perhaps dear old Roger Delgado is the wrong mascot; perhaps I should have gone with:

How to Note the Death of a Culture Warrior?

I have to admit, the death of Andrew Breitbart is both a tragedy and a challenge. It's a tragedy, obviously, for his family, friends, and colleagues--for the loss of so much potential when a life is cut short. Breitbart's death has occasioned some mockery, but such mockery involves a judgment that is not for us to make, but for God alone, and fails to recognize the pain that death causes family and friends of the deceased.

I'm sorry for his family, friends, and colleagues, and for Breitbart himself--it's a terrible thing to die so young. But without justifying the inappropriate reactions on the left to his death, Andrew Sullivan's post describing such reactions as evincing "sickness" comparable to that demonstrated by a federal judge in Montana who used his court-provided computer to forward a joke suggesting that President Obama's conception took place at a party with booze, interracial sex and bestiality--well, no. That grossly oversimplifies a cynical reaction to a complex moral situation--and that presents the challenge.

Sullivan writes elsewhere that "[w]e were often at crossed swords online but tried not to make it personal. We spent the last time we were together sharing favorite pop music on our iPhones on an airplane." I've no doubt; Breitbart would have viewed Sullivan as a peer in the Internet blogosphere, and someone in the same "game." (No disrespect to Sullivan intended; just that they both could be described as large-scale bloggers, who leveraged their platforms into political influence). But as to non-peers, Breitbart made it personal when he felt he could get away with it. He cost Shirley Sherrod her job, falsifying the content of her speech by selective quotation that reversed the point she was making, and using carefully edited, doctored video as "proof," and, undeterred when he was caught, promoted similar stories against Planned Parenthood and ACORN. That's more than being what Sullivan described Breitbart as, a partisan who "doled it out relentlessly."

Ms. Sherrod took the high road today, saying "[m]y prayers go out to Mr. Breitbart's family as they cope through this very difficult time." That's the right thing to do, and bless her for it. But there was a lot of very legitimate anger at Breitbart for his irresponsible, reckless, and cruel tactics. Such anger should abate in the face of tragedy. Still, I can't help but think of R.F. Delderfield's line, from To Serve Them All My Days, about what he called "graveside hypocrisy": "To hear some people talk at a funeral, one would suppose dying was limited to the chosen few." (P. 407, 1972 Simon & Shuster ed.)

(Edited to restore disappeared link & text)

Butterflies and me

Do you, I wonder, remember the British comedy Butterflies? It starred Wendy Craig and Geoffrey Palmer, as Ria and Ben, a stay-at-hone mother and her dentist husband, and focused rather daringly for the time on the discontents of marriage for a woman who found the traditional roles of wife and mother stifling, and unsatisfying. And, while she tried gamely and persistently, Ria just wasn't domestic. Moreover, Ria was persistently courted by a rich younger man who was on her wavelength in a way Ben often failed to be, so the tension in the series was always would (and should) Ria junk her marriage, run off with Leonard, or at least sleep with hum? Ria's loyalty, her conventionality, and her genuine if bemused and frustrated love for Ben and her sons, held her back--if only just--but as she paced around the local church to Albinoni's "Adagio," viewers wondered if she would take the leap. Ben's sarcasm sometimes pushed her toward the jump, and as much of the humor came from Ben's snidery directed at Ria's cooking, at their two sons Adam and Russell and at his own foibles (especially in later episodes), anything was possible.

Over the years, the show subtly shifted its focus; the first few seasons took Ria's perspective almost entirely; in the later years, as Ben began to suspect that all was not well in their marriage, he sometimes became the viewpoint character, and tried to grapple with Ria's frustrations, or persuade himself that all was well, or share with her his own discontents in a life as a respectable dentist. Ria's perspective always anchored the show, but I loved the simple fact that in "Butterflies" there were no villains. Ria loved Ben, but was drawn to Leonard's appreciation of her, and his need. Ben loved Ria, but was perplexed at her unhappiness; he dealt with it by living life as a vale of irony. The boys loved their parents, but were young and it was the late 70s. They had more pressing concerns. It was real, and, in the best possible way, feminist. By which I mean it drew attention to the injustices embedded in culture that had constrained Ria's growth and choices, and made clear that Ben was complicit in her limitation without even knowing he was. Even Leonard often adored not Ria, but a fantasy figure--although, to be fair, as portrayed by Bruce Montague, there was a lot more to Leonard than that.

In one way, though--and this is the brilliance of Carla Lane's writing--Ben was a very good match for Ria. His sneaky concern for her well-being, his ability to joke her out of her more melodramatic solipsistic moments, and his deep love for this woman he doesn't understand earn our sympathy, and Palmer plays the role beautifully.

Ultimately, it's Wendy Craig's show, though--fetching, charming, tragic and overwrought by turns, she isn't afraid of Ria's ridiculous moments, or of her suburban sub-tragedy. She's the heart of this most unusual comedy.

Here's the Children in Need abbreviated Reunion episode, for longtime fans, such as myself:

George Herbert

Of course, after my previous, politico-legal post, I remembered today is George Herbert's day. Let's not end the day of so beautiful a poet, and so admirable a priest, on a note of reproof. Rather, here is one of Herbert's poems, about the nature of--well, wait a minute. Let the poet make his own point:

Prayer the church's banquet, angel's age,
God's breath in man returning to his birth,
The soul in paraphrase, heart in pilgrimage,
The Christian plummet sounding heav'n and earth
Engine against th' Almighty, sinner's tow'r,
Reversed thunder, Christ-side-piercing spear,
The six-days world transposing in an hour,
A kind of tune, which all things hear and fear;
Softness, and peace, and joy, and love, and bliss,
Exalted manna, gladness of the best,
Heaven in ordinary, man well drest,
The milky way, the bird of Paradise,
Church-bells beyond the stars heard, the soul's blood,
The land of spices; something understood.

For more about the spirituality of this poem, see Christopher Bryant's unpacking.

Pounding the Table

This article is stunning either in its disingenuousness or its ignorance. Money quote:

So far in American history, our government has respected the freedom of individual conscience and of institutional integrity for all the many religious groups that shape our society. The government has not compelled them to perform or pay for what their faith tells them is immoral. That’s what we’ve meant by freedom of religion. That’s what we had believed was protected by the U.S. Constitution.

That has, simply, never been the law. As the Supreme Court stated as long ago as 1879:

Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into practice?

(Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145. 166 (1879)).

For a little under 30 years, a handful of decisions carved out an exception to this general rule for actual religious practices which contravened generally applicable statutes, but which either involved parental control of their children's education or statutes which made exceptions for majority religions but not minority religions. These cases, which did not involve taxes or required insurance, were held not to apply to evenhandedly applied statutes that did not involve intrusion into the homes of religious believers by a majority led by Antonin Scalia in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). As Justice Scalia wrote:

They assert, in other words, that "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" includes requiring any individual to observe a generally applicable law that requires (or forbids) the performance of an act that his religious belief forbids (or requires). As a textual matter, we do not think the words must be given that meaning. It is no more necessary to regard the collection of a general tax, for example, as "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" by those citizens who believe support of organized government to be sinful, than it is to regard the same tax as "abridging the freedom . . . of the press" of those publishing companies that must pay the tax as a condition of staying in business. It is a permissible reading of the text, in the one case as in the other, to say that if prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the activity of printing) is not the object of the tax, but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended. Our decisions reveal that the latter reading is the correct one. We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. On the contrary, the record of more than a century of our free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that proposition.

494 U.S. at 878-879. See also Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (rejecting free exercise challenge to payment of income taxes alleged to make religious activities more difficult).

The Cardinal's analysis on the constitutional point is, simply, predicated on what may most charitably be called an error, but an error that is obvious to anyone who has taken more than a few minutes to review the jurisprudence; he has taken a very narrow "conscience exemption" applicable to very specific and personal decisions and tried to turn it into a general exemption from laws of which he disapproves.